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Abstract 
The term carbon leakage is used for the effect that a part of the CO2 reduction that is 
achieved by countries that abate CO2 emissions is offset by an increase in CO2 emissions 
in non-abating countries. CO2 reduction policies may increase the costs of producing 
CO2-intensive goods and services, increase their price and reduce the rewards for factors 
and commodities intensive in their production. While these cost increases might stimu-
late innovation and technological change, they might also lead to changes in interna-
tional patterns of trade and investment and might thus change the international pattern of 
CO2 emissions: reducing them in abating countries and increasing them in non-abating 
countries.  
The aim of this report is to provide a critical assessment of the available literature on 
carbon leakage, both conceptual and quantitative. After a brief introduction to the con-
cept of carbon leakage, this reports discusses the mechanisms (or “channels”) through 
which it can occur. Subsequently, it presents and discusses a number of estimates of the 
potential size of leakage.  
Finally, the report considers some implications for the post-Kyoto agenda on climate 
policies. In general, it concludes that while a certain amount of leakage may be unavoid-
able in the short to medium term, in the long run sustainable innovation in the energy 
system, competitiveness and leakage reduction should go hand in hand.   
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Summary for policy makers 
The term carbon leakage is used for the effect that a part of the CO2 reduction that is 
achieved by countries that abate CO2 emissions is offset by an increase in CO2 emissions 
in non-abating countries. CO2 reduction policies may increase the costs of producing 
CO2-intensive goods and services, increase their price and reduce the rewards for factors 
and commodities intensive in their production. While these cost increases might stimu-
late innovation and technological change (Sijm, 2004b), they might also lead to changes 
in international patterns of trade and investment and might thus change the international 
pattern of CO2 emissions: reducing them in abating countries and increasing them in 
non-abating countries.  
The size of carbon leakage because of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is still 
uncertain: it is estimated that between 5 and 20 percent of CO2 mitigation in Annex I 
countries will be offset by increases in emissions by non-Annex I countries. Some ob-
servers expect a lower rate of leakage because they expect that governments of Annex I 
countries will take active measures to prevent industrial relocation. A higher rate of 
leakage may, however, be caused by the non-participation of major Annex I countries 
such as the U.S. and Australia and non-binding targets for Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. 
In the literature, a number of distinct mechanisms or “channels” of carbon leakage have 
been identified. The most important channels can be grouped under the following four 
headings: i) international trade in energy goods, ii) international trade in other goods and 
services, iii) international trade in factors of production, and iv) international interaction 
among government policies. There seems to be some consensus among researchers that 
while changes in the international markets of energy goods is the dominant source of 
carbon leakage in the short to medium term, the relocation of international investment 
and industrial relocation may well become the dominant source of carbon leakage in the 
more distant future.  
Carbon leakage reduces the global cost-effectiveness of domestic and EU CO2 mitigation 
measures. The first-best policy to counteract leakage is increasing country participation 
in international greenhouse gas mitigation agreements. The second-best policy is apply-
ing trade measures to the import and export of CO2-intensive manufactures in the inter-
national trade with non-participants to the above agreements. The third-best policy is to 
design and implementation of domestic or European emission reduction schemes that 
combine an effective ‘abatement effect’ with a weak ‘output-substitution’ effect for ‘ex-
posed’ sectors. International emissions trading is a valuable option in this respect.  
An alternative option would be to accept a certain ‘unavoidable’ rate of leakage in the 
short to medium term (which is believed to be primarily caused by relative changes in 
the prices of energy goods) and concentrate on action to avoid leakage through industrial 
relocation in the long run. In the long run, sustainable innovation in the energy system, 
competitiveness and leakage reduction should go hand in hand. 
 

Spillovers owing to carbon leakage  1
1. Introduction 
The term carbon leakage is used for the effect that a part of the CO2 reduction that is 
achieved by countries that abate CO2 emissions is offset by an increase in CO2 emissions 
in non-abating countries. CO2 reduction policies may increase the costs of producing 
CO2-intensive goods and services, increase their price and reduce the rewards for factors 
and commodities intensive in their production. While these cost increases might stimu-
late innovation and technological change, they might also lead to changes in interna-
tional patterns of trade and investment and might thus change the international pattern of 
CO2 emissions: reducing them in abating countries and increasing them in non-abating 
countries. Model predictions of the rates of carbon leakage due to the implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol range from very small to very large. 
This report presents a structured assessment of the academic literature on carbon leakage 
and formulates its potential implications for policy. The structure of the report is as fol-
lows. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of carbon leakage and explains why carbon leak-
age can be characterized as an international ‘distortion’. Chapter 3 identifies different 
‘channels’ of carbon leakage and discusses the main findings in the literature on each of 
these channels. Chapter 4 presents a brief overview of the modeling approaches towards 
the estimation of the size of carbon leakage in specific policy scenarios. Chapter 4 also 
presents some estimates of the size of carbon leakage and discusses their validity and 
limitations Chapter 5 presents some ideas on the policy implication of carbon leakage in 
international climate change policies, while Chapter 6 offers overall conclusions. 
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2. The concept of carbon leakage 
Carbon leakage is defined as the increase in CO2 emissions in non-abating countries as 
the result of CO2 emission reduction policies in countries that abate CO2 emissions. Fig-
ure 2.1 gives a schematic representation of international climate change policies in the 
context of an open world economy. The representation is extremely simplified, abstract-
ing from (important) things such as time, the extremely complicated physical relation-
ships between emissions and climate change, the so-called flexibility mechanisms of 
climate change policy, and other policies. Moreover, the world of Figure 2.1 consists of 
only two countries, but these two countries can be taken to represent two groups of coun-
tries. The aim of this schematic representation is to highlight the most important rela-
tionships between the economy and the climate system that are the subject of this study. 
Arrows depict these relationships. 
At the bottom of Figure 2.1 international climate change policies are formulated, moti-
vated by scientific evidence on changes in the earth’s climate and man’s contributions to 
these changes. The negotiations among nations at the international level lead to an 
agreement on emissions reduction targets for individual nations. These individual coun-
try targets differ. Figure 2.1 distinguishes between two countries (or groups of coun-
tries): country A agrees to a binding reduction target, while country NA does not.  
The internationally agreed reduction targets are adopted by domestic policy-makers who 
design and implement domestic policies to meet the internationally agreed targets. These 
policies seek to achieve their goal by affecting production and consumption decisions, 
directly – through command-and-control instruments – or indirectly – through market-
based instruments. The domestic policies will in general lead to changes in the pattern of 
international trade. For example, as policy measures in country A – such as a carbon tax 
– increase the production costs of its industries that produce CO2-intensive goods, con-
sumers in country A may shift from the more expensive domestic supplies of CO2-
intensive goods to imports of these goods from country NA that has not implemented 
such cost-increasing policies. 
The international climate change policy would then indirectly – through changes in na-
tional policies and their effects on production and consumption – affect the pattern of in-
ternational trade. If a producer of CO2-intensive goods in country A decides to move his 
factory to country NA in order to avoid the cost-increasing policy measures in country A, 
then there would also be an effect on international capital and investment flows. Either 
through changes in trade or investment, country NA would now produce a larger share of 
the world production of CO2-intensive goods. Hence, all else being equal, the national 
emissions of country NA would rise.  
 Institute for Environmental Studies 4
Global emissions
Economy
National climate 
change policy
Economy
WTO trade 
rules
International climate change policies
Trade and 
investment
National emissions National emissions
Country A Country NA
Climate
 
Figure 2.1 A schematic representation of international climate change policies in the 
context of the world economy. 
Given then the CO2 reduction policy in country A and the policy-induced rise in CO2 
emissions in country NA, the rate of carbon leakage is the ratio of the policy-induced in-
crease of emissions from country NA over the reduction of emissions by country A. That 
is, if country A implements measures to reduce emissions by 10 Mt of CO2 and if the 
emissions of country NA increase by 2 Mt of CO2 as a result of A’s measures, the rate of 
carbon leakage is 
Increase in emissions of country NA 2 *100% 20%
Reduction in emissions of country A 10
= =  (2.1)
Carbon leakage is an example of an international pollution externality whose theoretical 
implications have been studied in the literature (see, e.g., Markusen, 1975; Hoel, 1996). 
Markusen analyzed how the existence of an international pollution externality (such as 
CO2 emissions) would affect the optimality of free trade. He used an analytical two-
commodity, two country general equilibrium model.  
Take the two countries of figure 2.1 as an example. Country A abates CO2 emissions, 
while country NA does not. Each country produces two commodities, say, food and 
manufactures. It is assumed that the international pollution externality is a fixed by-
product of one of these commodities, say, of manufactures. Country A wants to abate the 
international externality because it is an argument in its social welfare function, that is, 
the citizens of country A have a positive preference for a stable climate. The pollution 
externality is an additive function of the pollution of both countries. It is assumed that 
country NA has no pollution tax or that it does not optimally adjust its tax rate in re-
sponse to actions of country A. In this two-country, two-commodity model, the world 
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price ratio between food and manufactures depends on the foreign offer schedules of the 
two countries. The simple mechanism is that the more of a commodity that is offered on 
the world market, the lower will be its price in relation to the other commodity, and vice 
versa. It is assumed, for simplicity, that the domestic price ratio in country NA is identi-
cal to the world price ratio. Suppose that country A is a net exporter of manufactures. 
The optimal tariff argument says that country A could improve its terms of trade by tax-
ing its exports of manufactures. The export tax will make it less attractive for country A 
manufacturing firms to export and they will offer fewer exports to the world market. In 
this two-country model total world market supply will fall. The reduced world market 
supply of manufactures will increase the world market price of manufactures in terms of 
food. Hence, country A could buy more food from country NA for less manufactures: its 
terms of trade would increase. In the case that country A is a net importer of manufac-
tures, it should, for analogues reasons, tax the imports of manufactures (apply a tariff). 
Given knowledge on all relevant supply and demand elasticities it is possible to calculate 
an ‘optimal’ tariff for country A that maximizes its income in terms of manufactures and 
food.1 
If the production of manufactures produces an international pollution externality as a by-
product, the optimal tariff should not only take account of the terms of trade effect, but 
also of its effect on foreign pollution. In the case that country A is a net exporter of 
manufactures, the optimal tariff argument advocates an export tax that will increase the 
world market price ratio of manufactures. This increase in price ratio, however, will also 
affect the production equilibrium in country NA, where resources will be shifted from 
agriculture to the now more profitable manufactures sector. This shift causes additional 
pollution, which will negatively affect consumers in country A through its effect on the 
social welfare function. In the case that country A is a net importer of manufactures, the 
‘optimal’ tariff has an opposite effect on the world market price ratio, hence decreasing 
foreign pollution.  
Markusen (1975) showed that the optimal tax structure for country A in the case of an in-
ternational externality (e.g., transboundary pollution) consists of a production (or pollu-
tion)2 tax on manufactures and a tariff. The optimal production (or pollution) tax is a 
conventional Pigovian tax3 whose rate is equal to the domestic marginal damage of the 
pollution. The tariff is made up of two terms: an optimal tariff term – to take advantage 
of a country’s market power – and a foreign pollution term. The foreign pollution term 
takes account of the domestic environmental damage due to foreign emissions. In the 
case that country A is a net exporter of manufactures, the foreign pollution term is nega-
tive. This is because the optimal tariff would increase the world market price of manu-
factures and would therefore stimulate its foreign production and pollution. Because of 
                                                   
1  In this example, the ‘optimal’ tariff of country A reduces the terms of trade of country B: 
country B can buy less manufactures in terms of food. The possibility of retaliation by coun-
try B reduces the practical attractiveness of the optimal tariff argument for country A.  
2  In this case, where pollution is assumed to be a fixed by-product of production, there is no 
difference between a pollution tax and a production tax.  
3  A Pigovian tax is named after the economist A.C. Pigou (1877-1959) who, in 1912, first sug-
gested that governments could, through a mixture of taxes and subsidies, correct market fail-
ures caused by external effects or ‘internalise the externalities’.  
 Institute for Environmental Studies 6
its transboundary nature, a part of this induced foreign pollution would cause damage in 
country A. Country A must therefore make a trade-off between improved terms of trade 
and increased environmental damage. Markusen (1975) showed that it would be optimal 
for country A to reduce its optimal tariff below the rate that would be optimal without the 
international externality. In the case that country A is a net importer of manufactures, its 
‘optimal’ tariff (import tax) on manufactures should be increased.   
Moreover, Markusen also showed that in case the government cannot make use of the 
tariff instrument (because its use is for example restricted by international agreement 
within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4), the optimal production 
(or pollution) tax would, in the case of an international externality, in general differ from 
the conventional Pigovian tax. Hoel (1996) developed this argument further and directly 
applied it to the climate change policy problem. The major extension of Hoel’s model is 
that he introduced a carbon tax that can be levied on fossil fuels both as a consumption 
good and as an input to production. Furthermore, he extended the number of commodi-
ties that are produced in both countries. Although Hoel himself did not use the term, the 
foreign pollution effect in Hoel’s model can be called carbon leakage. The first-best do-
mestic policy for country A in Hoel’s model is similar to that of Markusen’s: an equal 
carbon tax for all domestic users of fossil fuels and an ‘optimal tariff’ that takes account 
of its impact on international carbon leakage. Hoel (1996) noted that carbon leakage 
might be large, even if the influence of country A on world prices is small (a large elas-
ticity of foreign demand). This is because even a small increase in a large volume of for-
eign emissions may generate a large increase in foreign emissions relative to the volume 
of emissions reduction of country A.  
The analyses of Markusen and Hoel make clear that carbon leakage is an international 
distortion. The distortion is caused by a lack of global cooperation on climate change 
policies. Because of this distortion, the optimality of free trade is compromised. In prin-
ciple, Markusen’s optimal tariff could rectify this allocative distortion, but in practice 
there seems to be little scope for such tariffs because of legal, political and computa-
tional/informational reasons. The second-best alternative of differentiating carbon taxes 
across sectors to take account of carbon leakage may be even more difficult in practice, 
as Hoel pointed out in a thoughtful discussion of his analytical results (Hoel, 1996).   
One computational/informational issue is the actual size of carbon leakage. Carbon leak-
age has been defined as the increase in CO2 emissions in non-abating countries as a re-
sult of CO2 reduction policies in abating countries. The causality makes direct measure-
ment extremely difficult. While it is not particularly difficult to measure the increase in 
CO2 emissions in any one country, it is extremely difficult to decompose this increase 
into increases that are i) the result of CO2 abatement policies in foreign countries and in-
creases that are ii) the result of all other driving forces, including autonomous shifts in 
the international allocation of CO2-intensive industries.  
                                                   
4  The GATT is one of the trade agreements administered by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). 
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While measuring is and will probably remain problematic, some insights into the poten-
tial of carbon leakage can be gained by better understanding the mechanisms through 
which it can occur. The next section discusses these mechanisms.       
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3. The ‘channels’ of carbon leakage  
In the literature, a number of distinct mechanisms or ‘channels’ of carbon leakage have 
been identified. The most important channels can be grouped under the following four 
headings: 
1. International trade in energy goods; 
2. International trade in other goods and services; 
3. International trade in factors of production; 
4. International interaction among government policies. 
Below, the specific mechanisms underlying each channel are explained and selected re-
search findings on carbon leakage are presented for each channel. 
In addition to the channels discussed in this report, there may also be so-called technol-
ogy spillovers. These are the subjects, however, of the accompanying report by Sijm 
(2004b). 
3.1 International trade in energy goods  
CO2 reduction policies in a large region may well have a significant negative effect on 
the world demand for carbon-rich fossil fuels, causing a possible fall in their world mar-
ket prices. Falling prices could increase the demand for carbon-rich fuels in the rest of 
the world, thus increasing foreign CO2 emissions and enlarging carbon leakage. OECD 
(1999) referred to this mechanism of carbon leakage as the ‘energy channel’. Of key 
relevance to the quantitative importance of the energy channel are assumptions on the ef-
fects of CO2 reduction policies on the demand for specific fuels, changes in world mar-
ket prices, the supply response of fossil fuel producers, and the demand response of en-
ergy users in non-constrained countries. These assumptions are summarized in the pa-
rameters that reflect the: 
• Trade elasticities of fossil fuels; 
• Supply elasticities of fossil fuels; 
• Substitution elasticities in production among different fuels and between fuels 
and other factors of production; and 
• The structure of the energy market. 
Trade elasticities reflect the level of integration of the world market for a specific prod-
uct. With large trade elasticities, market changes in one country or region give rise to 
relatively large effects on world trade and therefore to relatively large market changes in 
other regions. Hence, all else being equal, large trade elasticities for fossil fuels generate 
a large rate of leakage. 
The relevance of the supply elasticity of fossil fuels, and thus, indirectly, the supply elas-
ticity of carbon becomes clear if one realizes that, ultimately, the volume of energy-
related carbon that is emitted to the atmosphere is almost exactly equal5 to the volume of 
                                                   
5  Fossil fuel combustion implies oxidising the carbon contained in the fuel; most carbon is 
emitted as CO2, but a small and variable part as CO, VOCs and other compounds. 
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carbon contained in fossil fuels that is mined or extracted from the earth and supplied to 
the market and combusted. Assuming elastic demand, if the supply of fossil fuels (and 
thus carbon) would be completely inelastic, there is no quantity response to a price 
change, and any amount of CO2 emission reduction in some region must be matched by 
an equal amount of additional emissions in another region. Hence, the more inelastic the 
supply elasticity, the higher the rate of carbon leakage and vice versa (OECD, 1999). 
The sensitivity of carbon leakage to supply elasticities of fossil fuels, and especially to 
the supply elasticity of coal, is generally acknowledged in the literature (Light, Kolstad, 
& Rutherford, 1999). 
Coal has the highest carbon content of fossil fuels, and changes in the international trade 
in coal may therefore have a relatively large effect on carbon leakage. It is sometimes 
argued that national coal markets are not very well integrated into a world coal market. 
Reasons for this include its relatively high transportation costs and the cost and time that 
are needed for building-up infrastructure for storage and distribution. If national markets 
are not well integrated, a lower price of coal in, for example, the U.S. or Australia would 
not directly lead to lower prices of coal in, for example, China or India and would there-
fore not directly lead to additional demand for coal (and associated emissions) in these 
non-Annex I countries. In such a case, ‘coal leakage’ may be minimal, even if its elastic-
ity of supply would be very small. If the demand for coal in abating countries would fall, 
a small elasticity of supply would mean that its price would have to fall sharply in order 
to restore the equilibrium between demand and supply. Without a proper world market 
and hence low trade elasticities, the price fall could be restricted to the national market.6 
The elasticity of substitution between inputs in the production of goods and services can 
also play a role in the explanation of carbon leakage. There are two elasticities that are 
potentially important: 
• The elasticity of substitution among fuels with a different carbon content: the in-
ter-fuel elasticity; 
• The elasticity of substitution between energy and other factors of production 
(capital, labor): the inter-factor elasticity. 
Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2000) found a U-shaped relationship between inter-fuel 
substitution elasticity and the rate of leakage. At relatively low inter-fuel substitution 
elasticities, the demand for all carbon-based fuels in abating countries will decrease al-
most proportionally. Given the supply elasticities in their economic model7 (high for 
coal, lower for oil), the world market price of oil will fall more than the price of coal, 
and producers in non-abating countries will shift their fuel mix towards the cheaper oil to 
the extent that is determined by their inter-fuel substitution possibilities. The net result is 
that at relatively low values of the inter-fuel substitution elasticity, an increase of that 
elasticity leads to a reduction of leakage. At relatively high inter-fuel substitution elastic-
                                                   
6  This would lead to an increased national uptake of coal, but this would not lead to higher na-
tional emissions because these emissions are assumed to be ‘capped’ by the Kyoto Protocol. 
This could lead to substitution between coal and other fuels and subsequent effects on the 
world markets of these other fuels. These and related interactions between markets are major 
reasons for the frequent use of applied general equilibrium models to study carbon leakage.    
7  The GREEN model, see Appendix. 
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ities, the demand for fossil fuels in abating countries will decrease in proportion to the 
carbon-content of fuels. That is, the demand for coal will fall more than that for oil and 
gas. The demand for oil and gas may even increase. Given the relative low elasticity of 
supply of oil and gas, their prices might rise relative to the price of coal. The price effect 
is then the reverse of that in the previous case, and demand for coal will increase in the 
non-abating countries, inducing an increase in carbon leakage. At these higher values of 
inter-fuel substitution elasticity, an increase in that elasticity leads to an increase in 
leakage. Similar results are found for the inter-factor elasticity of substitution (Burniaux 
& Oliveira Martins, 2000). 
It is sometimes assumed that energy producers (such as those participating in OPEC) 
have enough market power to maintain energy prices by restricting output in the face of 
falling demand. In such a case, the elasticity of supply might be so large as to prevent 
any price effects. Babiker and Jacoby (1999) have examined this assumption, but found 
that OPEC coordination action is not very likely because “the [high] elasticities of de-
mand of importing countries, and of supply of non-OPEC exporters, combine to produce 
a market condition where efforts to resist a fall in oil price resulting from Kyoto restric-
tions lead to still lower OPEC revenue.” (Babiker & Jacoby, 1999: 15). In other words, 
Babiker and Jacoby argued that under these market conditions OPEC would in fact be 
worse off if it tried to maintain oil prices by reducing supply. 
3.2 International trade in other goods and services 
Carbon reduction policies may increase the production costs of carbon-intensive indus-
tries in abating countries and may therefore increase the selling prices of their goods. 
The demand for these goods may shift to relatively cheaper sources in non-abating coun-
tries whose costs have not been affected by carbon reduction policies. Hence, compara-
tive advantage would shift to industries in non-abating countries and this would affect 
production and trade. All else being equal, this would increase CO2 emissions in these 
non-abating countries. Two parameters are of key importance with respect to carbon 
leakage through this ‘trade channel’. They are: 
• The substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods; 
• The degree of international capital mobility; and 
• The market structure. 
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods (and between im-
ported goods of different origin) in applied general equilibrium (AGE) models is typi-
cally finite. This is a modeler’s convention, following the approach suggested by Arm-
ington (1969) to treat goods of different origin as different, non-homogeneous goods.8 
The elasticity of substitution is therefore also called the Armington elasticity. Burniaux 
and Oliveira Martins (2000) found that carbon leakage is not very sensitive to the value 
of the Armington elasticities. This finding is, however, contested by others and may be 
model-specific. For example, Böhringer and Rutherford (2000) and Paltsev (2001) found 
                                                   
8  The Armington specification of international trade has the advantage that intra-industry trade 
can be accounted for and that unrealistically strong specialization effects due to changes in 
trade policy are avoided. In AGE models on CO2 reduction policies, only crude oil is often 
assumed to be a perfectly homogeneous good.  
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that the values of the Armington elasticities have a significant impact on the rate of leak-
age: the larger the trade elasticities (the more homogeneous the goods), the larger the 
rate of leakage.  
While the above studies, with the exception of Babiker and Jacoby (1999), examined 
carbon leakage in perfectly competitive markets, different mechanisms are responsible 
for carbon leakage in imperfectly competitive markets. Examples of such imperfectly 
competitive markets are oligopolistic markets and monopolistic competition.  
In an oligopolistic market, a small number of firms compete directly with each other. In 
making price and quantity decisions a firm in such a market must take account, not only 
of responses of consumers, but also of the responses of their competitors, whose re-
sponses depend, in their turn, on their expectations of the firm’s behavior (Krugman & 
Obstfeld, 2000: Chapter 6). If a firm in an oligopolistic international market reduces its 
supply because of the cost-increasing effects of CO2 reduction policies in one country, 
competitors in other countries may have a direct strategic incentive to expand their sup-
plies (and emissions). An overview of carbon leakage through oligopolistic interaction 
among firms is given by Ulph (1997). An important result of the oligopolistic interaction 
research is that the type of policy instrument matters in these circumstances, i.e., the in-
centive for strategic environmental policy is larger when emission taxes are used than 
when emission standards (fixed emissions ceilings) are used. This is the case because the 
purpose of the strategic intervention is to let the output of a domestic industry expand at 
the expense of foreign competitors. In the case of a fixed emission tax per unit of pollu-
tion, the environmental costs of a firm rise proportionally with output. In the case of an 
emission standard, environmental costs may rise more-than-proportionally with output if 
the marginal abatement cost curve is sloping upwards (each additional unit of abatement 
is more expensive than the previous unit).  
Gürtzen and Rauscher (2000) examined the effects of climate change policies in the case 
of monopolistic competition. In a monopolistic market structure, firms produce a contin-
uum of differentiated goods; each firm produces a specific variety (say, a “Volvo” car). 
Consumers prefer variety over uniformity. In the case of a CO2 reduction policy, the 
production costs of firms increase and the number of domestic firms that can operate 
profitably decreases.9 This would lead to a decrease of variety in the domestic market. 
Because a decrease of variety reduces the substitution possibilities between any two va-
rieties, the mark-ups that (foreign) producers can charge in excess of marginal costs in-
creases 10 and therefore the number of foreign firms (and foreign emissions) increases. 
Hence, this market structure effect may be an additional channel of carbon leakage.  
Carbon leakage through the trade channel can also be influenced by the degree of inter-
national capital mobility. As is well known from the international trade literature, trade 
                                                   
9  Gürtzen and Rauscher (2000) also discussed conditions under which the number of firms in-
creases due to a tightening of environmental policy. Although this may indeed be a conse-
quence of their model, this possibility seems to be extremely ‘counter-intuitive’ and of little 
relevance. An increase in the number of monopolistic firms in the abating country may lead 
to negative leakage. 
10  The mark-up that a monopolistic firm can charge is inversely related to the absolute value of 
the demand elasticity of its produced variety.  
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in goods and trade in factors of production (e.g., capital) can be substitutes or comple-
ments. If trade in goods and trade in factors are substitutes, an increase in one will re-
duce the other. For example, starting from a situation with free trade in goods, but re-
strictions on the free international movement of capital, the liberalization of the interna-
tional capital market would reduce the international trade in goods. A car company may, 
for example, start a foreign subsidiary to produce for a foreign market instead of ship-
ping the cars abroad from its home production plant. If trade in goods and trade in fac-
tors of production are complements, an increase in one will increase the other. For ex-
ample, the car company may invest in a dealer network in the foreign country (a capital 
transfer) to increase the sale of its home-made cars (Markusen, Melvin, Kaempfer et al., 
1995: chapter 21; Rauscher, 1997: Chapter 3). Thus, international capital mobility can 
reduce or increase international trade in goods and services and hence carbon leakage 
through this channel.  
The channel of international trade in factors of production is also interesting in its own 
right. The next paragraph considers international trade in factors of production in more 
detail. 
3.3 International trade in factors of production 
Carbon reduction policies can reduce the productivity of factors that are employed in the 
production of fossil fuels or energy-intensive commodities. This may lead to an interna-
tional reallocation of such factors to countries without such policies. In the political 
arena, the effect of climate and energy policies on international capital reallocation is the 
“channel” that is most discussed and feared.11 Although the effect of international capital 
mobility on carbon leakage would seem to be fairly obvious, its potential importance in 
current climate change policies is an issue of some controversy in the academic litera-
ture.  
Conventional economic analysis of trade and environment interactions has been chal-
lenged on the grounds that it did not take (enough) account of international capital mo-
bility, a phenomenon that is supposedly rapidly growing in importance and is closely 
linked to the issue of globalization. In a critical assessment of conventional analysis, 
Daly (1993) asserted that the conclusions of this conventional analysis hinged on the 
critical assumption of the immobility of factors of production (especially capital). He ba-
sically asserted that the theorem of comparative advantage would be dependent upon the 
assumption of the immobility of factors, while mobility of factors would imply that the 
international allocation of production would be governed by absolute advantage (Daly, 
1993). The idea that the assumption of international immobility of capital is critical to 
                                                   
11  For example, in the early 1990s the Dutch Wolfson Commission predicted a large-scale real-
location of energy-intensive industries (or parts thereof) if energy taxes of the size that were 
under discussion then would be implemented (Herzberg & Minne, 1992). To put the findings 
of the Wolfson Commission in perspective, two remarks can be made. First, the Commission 
examined the effect of energy taxes (not CO2 taxes) so that substitution possibilities in pro-
duction within firms would be limited (and were in fact neglected), and second, the size of 
the energy taxes examined (up to 100 percent of then current energy prices) was orders-of-
magnitude larger than the implied increases in energy prices because of CO2 emissions re-
strictions that are currently under discussion.  
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the theory of international trade and therefore also to its extensions to environmental ex-
ternalities, is still echoed in more recent academic literature (see, e.g., Batra, Beladi, & 
Frasca, 1998). 
The theory of international trade has, however, dealt with the international mobility of 
factors. Already in 1957, Mundell (1957) showed that trade in goods and trade in factors 
were perfect substitutes in the classical Heckscher-Ohlin (comparative advantage) model 
of international trade. Mundell showed that in this model, equalization of commodity 
prices and factor prices could be brought about by trade in goods without capital mobil-
ity or by capital mobility without trade in goods. If both trade in goods and trade in fac-
tors lead to the same prices and allocation of resources, there can also be no differences 
in environmental outcomes between the two. Hence, it is justified in this kind of model 
to only consider trade in goods alone, or only trade in factors, or, indeed, any combina-
tion of both.  
When, however, some assumptions of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of interna-
tional trade are relaxed, e.g., perfect competition, common level of technology across 
countries, constant-returns-to-scale technologies, and the absence of domestic distor-
tions, the equivalence between trade in goods and trade in factors may break down. In 
some cases, trade in goods and trade in factors of production may even become comple-
mentary (Markusen et al., 1995). Springer (2000) discussed the exact conditions under 
which trade in goods and trade in factors can be complements rather than substitutes. In 
the case of complementarity, the internationally allocative effects of climate change 
policies may be magnified by international capital mobility. Neglecting this magnifying 
effect could lead to a biased (under-) estimate of international carbon leakage. 
The location choice of firms is the subject of an extensive body of research that is known 
as ‘new economic geography’ (see for instance Fujita et al., 1999). Although this litera-
ture is not directly related to environmental issues, its overall conclusions are relevant 
(see also Elbers and Withagen, 2004) or transferable to the environmental literature. 
Baldwin and Krugman (2000) for instance analyzed the effect of corporate taxation in 
the presence of agglomeration forces in falling trade costs. With agglomeration forces, 
the location choice of a firm is not irrelevant. These authors showed for instance that “in-
tegration need not lead to falling tax rates, and might well be consistent with the mainte-
nance of large welfare states”. If one is willing to equate corporate taxation with envi-
ronmental taxation (or carbon policies), the presence of agglomeration forces might be 
one element that would limit the leakage problem. Other literature that could be men-
tioned here includes Albrecht (1998), Jeppesen and Folmer (2001), and List et al. (2003). 
In general, imperfect competition and agglomeration effects could reduce or increase re-
location effects and carbon leakage due to environmental policies 
The potential environmental impact of international capital mobility has been well rec-
ognized in the theoretical literature, also within the framework of the (broadly-defined) 
comparative advantage model of international trade. The extent of this potential impact 
has been the subject of econometric estimation and model simulation.  
The first question that needs to be answered relates to the international mobility of capi-
tal: how mobile is capital internationally? In the popular image capital is extremely mo-
bile across countries, but research has found surprisingly little evidence of international 
mobility of real capital. Researchers have found limited international portfolio diversifi-
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cation, a high correlation between domestic savings and investments and significant real 
interest differentials across countries (Gordon & Bovenberg, 1996). Wang and Winters 
(2001) surveyed an extensive literature on the impacts of locational factors on foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) decisions of multilateral companies. These locational factors in-
clude tax concessions and government policies, labor cost differentials and environ-
mental factors. Wang and Winters concluded from this literature i) that the relative level 
of taxation is just one variable that affects FDI, but is rarely a primary motive, ii) that la-
bor costs differentials (accounting for differences in labor productivity) is also a factor, 
though not of major significance, and iii) that the studies seem to suggest “quite 
strongly” that there is little evidence for industrial flight from countries with strict envi-
ronmental standards. The authors therefore conjectured that “it would be very difficult to 
believe that imposing a carbon tax (of around 100 USD/tC) in the OECD will cause seri-
ous industrial flight from OECD to non-OECD countries.” (Wang & Winters, 2001 
:151). 
The empirical literature on the effect of environmental regulation on firm relocation is 
ambiguous and highly sensitive to empirical specification, data (cross-sectional or panel 
data, level of aggregation), and a host of specific assumptions regarding the exact design 
of the policy measure and other variables (Jeppeson, List, and Folmer, 2002). Jeppeson, 
List and Folmer concluded on the basis of an extensive meta-analysis of the empirical 
literature that it is as yet impossible to draw any firm conclusions on the effect of envi-
ronmental regulations on [international] capital flows (Jeppeson, List, and Folmer, 2002: 
36). 
Simulation studies with applied general equilibrium models seem to suggest that capital 
flight from abating to non-abating countries will not be of major significance in the con-
text of the Kyoto Protocol, at least not during the time up to the first commitment period 
(2008-2012) (McKibbin, Ross, Shackleton et al., 1999; Burniaux et al., 2000; Babiker, 
2001; Burniaux, 2001; Paltsev, 2001). One major factor is simply that the ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of developing countries for foreign capital is considered to be relatively small 
(McKibbin et al., 1999). Another factor may be that carbon leakage in non-abating coun-
tries would be basically ‘self-financed’ because of the relative fall of fossil fuel prices on 
the world market (Babiker, 2001). Because of reduced input costs (for fuels) and stable 
or higher output prices, energy-intensive industries in non-abating countries would see 
their profits rise and could therefore easily finance the expansion of their production out 
of these extra profits. In this sense, carbon leakage would not really require any addi-
tional capital flows.  
While there is nearly overall consensus on the limited contribution of capital mobility to 
carbon leakage in the near term, Burnieaux (2001) asserted that the relocation of interna-
tional investment may well become the dominant source of carbon leakage in the more 
distant future (after 2010) in the absence of major breakthroughs in renewable energy 
technologies. In a paper for the International Energy Agency, Gielen and Karbuz (2003) 
also expected that industrial relocation might be the primary source of leakage in the 
long term. When CO2 reduction policies would become more stringent, relocation could 
become a serious threat, especially to specific, CO2-intensive sectors. 
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3.4 International interaction among government policies 
Up till this point in this overview, the policies of abating and non-abating countries were 
assumed to be given: a country either had a given emissions reduction target or not. 
However, when this assumption is relaxed and countries may be assumed to choose car-
bon reduction policies on the basis of some trade-off between costs and benefits, this 
may also affect carbon leakage. Copeland and Taylor (2003) examined the response of a 
country to another country’s CO2 reduction policies, when the citizens of this country 
would not only be interested in the consumption of market goods and services, but 
would also derive utility from environmental services, such as those provided by a stable 
climate. The government of this country is assumed to maximize the utility or welfare of 
its citizens. Copeland and Taylor (2003) showed that the response of the country con-
tains two additional terms in addition to the changes in trade and investments that were 
discussed above:12  
The first additional term measures the free rider effect. The free rider effect captures the 
idea that one’s willingness to contribute to the provision of a public good is negatively 
affected by the willingness of others to contribute to this good. The optimal level of CO2 
reduction for a country is that level that equates the marginal abatement costs of emis-
sions reduction to the marginal damages of CO2 emissions, which is a function of both 
domestic and foreign emissions. If foreign emissions fall, the marginal damages of CO2 
emissions fall, and hence the optimal level of domestic abatement falls.13 The free rider 
effect is the only term of the response function that would also exist in autarky (in the 
absence of international trade). In autarky, domestic and foreign emissions are strategic 
substitutes. That is, the welfare-maximizing strategy of a government is to react on a for-
eign change in emissions by a change in domestic emissions in the opposite direction.  
Hence, through the free rider effect, the domestic country would always increase its 
emissions due to a foreign emissions reduction policy. 
The second additional term is a pure income effect, which Copeland and Taylor (2003) 
called the ‘bootstrapping effect’. Whether the bootstrapping effect is positive or negative 
depends on the trading pattern of the domestic country. If the domestic country is a net 
exporter of CO2-intensive goods (or a net importer of fossil fuels), its terms-of-trade will 
improve and its real income will rise (its domestic production has increased in value at 
world market prices: one unit of exports will buy more imports). If environmental qual-
ity is a normal good, a rise in income will increases the demand for environmental qual-
ity so the government will tighten environmental policy and reduce emissions. Con-
versely, if the domestic country is a net importer of CO2-intensive goods (or a net ex-
porter of fossil fuels), its real income will fall, demand for environmental quality will 
fall, and emissions will increase. The effect of the bootstrapping effect on carbon leakage 
is thus ambiguous.  
                                                   
12  In fact, Copeland and Taylor also distinguish a substitution effect in consumption, that would 
increase the demand for the environmental good (climate quality) if the relative prices of 
consumption goods would rise (because of environmental taxes).   
13  Only, of course, under certain (but fairly standard) assumptions on the signs of the first de-
rivatives of the abatement and damage functions.  
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All terms together (trade/investment, free-riding, bootstrapping) determine the ‘optimal’ 
(i.e., welfare-maximizing) change in domestic emissions in response to a foreign reduc-
tion policy. The sign of this ‘optimal’ change is ambiguous. Copeland and Taylor (2003) 
stressed that carbon leakage might be negative under the assumption of endogenous poli-
cies, when the bootstrapping effect dominates the free rider and the trade/investment ef-
fects.  
How relevant is the assumption of endogenous policies to international climate change 
policies? Copeland and Taylor argued that while the graduation of developing countries 
into the abating countries under the Kyoto Protocol (the Annex I countries) “may seem 
unlikely at present, it is unwise to rule out such possibilities a priori especially when the 
policy experiment under consideration involves extremely large time horizons and po-
tentially large changes in income.” (Copeland & Taylor, 2003: 17).     
3.5 Conclusions 
A number of channels of carbon leakage may be distinguished:  
• Through changes in the pattern of international trade of energy commodities; 
• Through changes in the pattern of international trade of CO2-intensive goods and 
services; 
• Through the international relocation of capital; 
• Through the interactions of government policies. 
Many studies have analyzed one or more of these channels, both from theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. It is not easy to summarize the main findings of scientific re-
search in this area, as there is ample discussion, controversy and speculation, and there is 
not much hard empirical evidence to go by. However, a few points can be mentioned. 
Most applied modelers seem to agree that the ‘energy commodity’ channel is quantita-
tively the most important channel, at least in the short to medium term. It should be 
noted, however, that most ‘leakage’ studies do not take much account of possible strate-
gic behavior of large energy suppliers. If suppliers of fossil fuels could effectively re-
strict their total supply in response to diminishing demand in an attempt to stabilize mar-
ket prices, there would be a smaller price effect and hence less leakage. 
The effect of trade in CO2-intensive goods and services on carbon leakage is generally 
believed to be limited, but here too is a need for studies that employ alternative assump-
tions on market structure. 
A large amount of controversy exists on the effect of international reallocation of capital 
on carbon leakage. While some modelers assume that the contribution of capital mobility 
will be very limited (and mainly restricted to capital flows among the more advanced 
Annex I countries), others stress the importance of international capital mobility in this 
respect, especially in the longer term.  
At least from a theoretical point of view, a ‘negative’ rate of leakage is very well possi-
ble, but there is not yet much support for this thesis from more empirical research. 
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4. The potential size of carbon leakage  
The potential size of carbon leakage has been estimated by a number of economic mod-
els. In this section, a number of these estimates are presented. Differences between the 
estimates will, if possible, be related to differences in the underlying models, and espe-
cially by differences in their relevant parameters. These include the parameters that were 
discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter ends with a discussion on the sources of variance 
among leakage estimates. 
4.1 Economic models 
For an ex-ante estimate of carbon leakage, one has to rely on economic models. As yet, 
carbon leakage has not been measured econometrically, and cannot be because no coun-
try has embarked on a serious emission reduction policy. Economic models are simplifi-
cations of economic reality and their results should be interpreted with caution. There are 
various types of economic models. Analytical models, such as those of Markusen and 
Hoel that were discussed in Chapter 2, may reveal the causes and consequences of car-
bon leakage, but they cannot estimate its size. Numerical models include macro-
econometric and applied general equilibrium (AGE) models. Both types of models have 
their specific strengths and weaknesses. The main difference between these types of 
models is that AGE models explicitly model the behavior of each economic agent that is 
distinguished in the model, while macro-econometric models base their equations on the 
historically observed (and econometrically estimated) outcomes of this behavior in mar-
kets. While AGE models are more firmly based in micro-economic theory, macro-
econometric models are sometimes praised for their greater level of realism. All model 
estimates of carbon leakage that are presented below are derived by AGE models, al-
though one of the models (G-Cubed) can perhaps better be described as a hybrid be-
tween an AGE and a macro-econometric model. For this assessment no estimates of car-
bon leakage were found that were derived by strictly macro-econometric models. 
4.2 Model estimates 
Studies on carbon leakage provide no consensus on the size and distribution of the leak-
ages generated by the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (OECD, 1999). Estimates of 
the size of leakage vary considerably. Table 4.1 reports on a number of estimates of car-
bon leakage between the original Annex I and non-Annex I countries of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol under the assumption that there will be no emissions trading among Annex I coun-
tries. The rates of leakage range between 5 percent in OECD’s GREEN model to 20 – 21 
percent in WorldScan and the model by Light et al. 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 20
Table 4.1 Some model estimates of rates of carbon leakage of CO2 reductions in An-
nex I countries according to Kyoto targets, without emissions trading. 
Carbon leakage rates in a number of models 
Model Carbon leakage (%) 
Light et al. 1999 21 % 
WorldScan 20 % 
MERGE 20 % 
GTAP-E  15% 
GTAP-EG  12% 
MIT-EPPA 6 % 
G-Cubed 6 % 
GREEN  5 % 
Sources: Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2000), Paltsev (2001), and Kuik and Gerlagh (2003).  
It was suggested in Chapter 3, that some part of the differences could be explained by 
examining the model’s assumptions on trade elasticities, especially those of energy 
goods, and supply elasticities of fossil fuels, especially those of coal. Table 4.2 presents 
trade and supply elasticities for a number of the above-mentioned models. Most models 
make use of the ‘Armington approach’ to model substitution in trade (Armington, 1969). 
Commonly, a difference is made between the elasticity of substitution of imports from 
different sources, σM, and the elasticity of substitution between the “composite” import 
and the domestic good, σD. The convention in most models is to use an elasticity of sub-
stitution of imports from different sources, σM, of twice the value of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between the composite import and the domestic good, σD. This has been re-
ported as an “empirical regularity” (Hertel, 1997) and has not been rejected by recent 
empirical work (Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic et al., 2003; Liu, Arndt, & Hertel, 2001). The 
Armington substitution elasticities between domestic and imported goods (σD) is infinity 
when considering perfectly homogeneous goods. In the GREEN model, oil is treated as 
such. In GTAP-E, oil is fairly elastic (σD=10).  
The supply elasticities of fossil fuels (ηS) indicate the rate of decreasing returns in the 
production of fossil fuels. There is some disagreement among models: while GREEN 
and MIT-EPPA assume an elastic supply response for coal and a less elastic supply for 
gas, WorldScan assumes the reverse. It is clear that additional research on (long-term) 
supply response of fossil fuel sectors could prove beneficial. 
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Table 4.2  Key elasticities in some AGE models that have been used to estimate carbon 
leakage.  
  σD: Armington substitution be-
tween domestic and imported 
goods  
σM: Armington sub-
stitution among im-
ports  
ηS: supply elasticity 
Model Oil Other goods Oil Other goods Coal Oil Gas 
Light et al. 4 4 8 8 0.5 0.5 0.5 
WorldScan 16 2-10 1)   1.8 1.9 9.0 
MERGE2)        
GTAP-E 10 2.8 20 5.6 0.5 0.5 0.53) 
GTAP-EG 4 4 8 8 1.0 1.0 1.0 
MIT-EPPA 3 3 4) 4 5 5) 5.4 6) 1.2 7) 1.8 
G-Cubed 1 1 1 1 –8) –8) –8) 
GREEN ∞ 4 ∞ 5 20.0 1.0 1.0 
1) Substitution elasticity of 2 for coal and gas, 5 for services, 6 for consumption goods, and 10 
for agricultural commodities. 
2) MERGE has a different structure, see text.  
3) For gas extraction, excluding transport and distribution. 
4) Except electricity: 0.3 
5) Except electricity: 0.5, other energy goods: 4, refined oil: 6. 
6) Except for China: 4.4 and India: 3.4. 
7) Except for energy exporting developing countries: 0.3 and Former Soviet Union: 0.6. 
8) Could not be found in the documentation of the model.   
Comparing the elasticities in Table 4.2 to the leakage rates in Table 4.1 it appears that 
variations in assumptions on the supply elasticities of coal can explain differences in 
leakage rates to a certain extent. The models with the lowest rate of leakage (GREEN 
and MIT-EPPA) have the highest supply elasticities of coal (ηs = 20 and 5.4, respec-
tively). The reverse is not completely true, however. While Light et al. indeed combines 
a high rate of leakage (21%) with a low elasticity of supply of coal (ηs = 0.5), WorldScan 
combines a high rate of leakage (20%) with a relatively high supply elasticity of coal (ηs 
= 1.8). 
In was suggested in Chapter 3 that assumptions on trade elasticities in the models could 
also explain some of the variation in the leakage results. Many models take the assump-
tion that oil is a homogeneous commodity with either infinite (GREEN) of very high 
(WorldScan, GTAP-E) trade elasticities. Trade elasticities for other energy goods (coal 
and gas) range from σD = 1 in G-Cubed to σD= 4 in Light et al., GREEN and GTAP-EG. 
It thus seems that assumptions on trade elasticities of energy goods do not explain differ-
ences in leakage across models very well. The same seems to apply to differences in 
trade elasticities of other goods.  
MERGE and G-Cubed are somewhat apart from the other models. MERGE combines a 
detailed energy supply sector and an aggregate representation of the rest of the economy. 
Trade among regions is only possible for oil, gas and a composite ‘energy-intensive ba-
sic materials’ good. The energy channel and the non-energy trade channel (energy-
intensive basic materials) each account for about half of the leakage in 2010.14 Policy-
                                                   
14  See Manne and Richels (1999), Figure 7. 
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induced relocation of production in energy-intensive basic materials is determined by the 
equalization of marginal supply costs across regions, assuming an upward sloping supply 
curve in each region and assuming no change in demand. G-Cubed is the only model of 
Table 4.1 that explicitly accounts for international borrowing and lending of countries in 
relation to their current account deficits and surpluses. Related to this focus on financial 
markets is the result that the international relocation of (financial) capital is an important 
indirect source of leakage in G-Cubed. G-Cubed, however, predicts a low rate of leakage 
to non-Annex I countries because it assumes a low absorptive capacity for capital in-
vestments in these countries in the short to medium term. The models of Table 4.1 are 
briefly discussed in the Appendix to this chapter. 
What other factors could explain the differences in leakage rate across the models? The 
Third Assessment Report of IPCC (2001) also reported a range of leakage estimates in 
the literature of 5–20 percent. It noticed that some reduction in variance among the esti-
mates of different studies has occurred in recent years. IPCC was, however, reluctant to 
accept this reduction of variance as a sign of increased scientific certainty on this issue. 
IPCC (2001) flagged the following parameters to be of critical significance to carbon 
leakage: 
• Trade elasticities;  
• Input substitution elasticities in the electricity and iron and steel industries in An-
nex I regions; 
• Degree of competitiveness in the world oil market; 
• International emissions trading. 
Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2000) and Burniaux (2001) offered a slightly different 
list of critical parameters. At the top of their list was the supply elasticity of fossil fuels, 
especially coal. Light et al. (1999) and Burniaux (2001) also stressed the importance for 
the size of carbon leakage of assumptions on the integration of the international coal 
market. Hence, there seems to be little consensus on the size of carbon leakage as well as 
on the key parameters that might influence it. Apart from differences in key elasticities, 
Barker and Johnstone (1998) identified additional sources of differences among the 
models that can lead to different predictions of carbon leakage: assumptions on exchange 
rate and monetary policies, international factor mobility, market power in the oil sector, 
expectations and adjustment, revenue recycling, the level of aggregation of regions, sec-
tors and fuels, technological change and strategic behavior. It is clear that no single study 
can address all these issues at the same time.  
Grubb et al. (2002) cited the IPCC range of 5–20 percent for the leakage rate, but they 
commented that this rate would probably be lower in reality, because they assumed a 
relatively high supply elasticity of international coal and oil supply relative to the elastic-
ity of demand and active government intervention to minimize industrial reallocation (or 
trade effects for the energy-intensive sectors) (Grubb, Hope, & Fouquet, 2002). 
Paltsev (2001) carried out a decomposition of carbon leakage to regions and industries. 
Paltsev’s aim was not to estimate the size of carbon leakage, but to examine which re-
gions and industries would be most sensitive to leakage. Paltsev accepted that the abso-
lute size of carbon leakage is still very uncertain and, with the current tools of analysis, 
mainly dependent upon model structure and parameterization. Using the GTAP-EG 
model, he found a leakage rate of 11.5 per cent as a central estimate for a policy scenario 
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that was based on the full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (including participation 
by the US). More important than this central estimate, however, Paltsev found that leak-
age would be most sensitive to CO2 reduction measures in the chemicals and iron and 
steel industries. With respect to geographical distribution, actions in the European Union 
could be responsible for about half of global carbon leakage (36-51%), followed by the 
United States (28-34%) and Japan (13-18%). On the receiving side, the largest increases 
in CO2 emissions could be expected in China (24-32% of carbon leakage) and the Middle 
East (24-30%) (Paltsev, 2001). 
Kuik and Gerlagh (2003) studied the effects of trade liberalization on carbon leakage. 
They found that GTAP-E’s central estimate of carbon leakage of 11 percent would in-
crease by 4 percentage-points to 15 percent if the global tariff reductions of the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO would be taken into account (see 
also Section 4.3 below).  
The estimates of Table 4.1 apply to carbon leakage between the original Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol. The estimates do not include potential 
leakage to Annex I countries without binding emissions reduction targets (Eastern Euro-
pean countries and FSU), nor to Annex I countries that have subsequently withdrawn 
from the Protocol, such as the US and Australia. Without effective CO2 mitigation poli-
cies in these countries, the overall leakage rate from, for example, Europe might be 
higher. In their assessment of the Kyoto protocol, Lejour and Manders (1999), estimated 
leakage to unconstrained Eastern European countries at 3.3 percent. Bollen et al. (2002) 
estimated that non-participation of the USA to the Kyoto Protocol could increase leakage 
from the participating countries from 14 to 22 percent.  
4.3 Carbon leakage and trade liberalization 
Carbon leakage has been identified as an international distortion in Chapter 2. Several 
mechanisms or “channels” of carbon leakage have been identified in Chapter 3. The 
common characteristic of all these channels is that they operate through international 
trade in goods or factors. It is obvious that there would be no leakage without interna-
tional trade. This does not imply that international trade is the cause of carbon leakage, 
but it is a necessary condition for leakage. A question that would seem to logically fol-
low from this observation is whether a certain degree of liberalization of trade, as for ex-
ample through multilateral trade agreements, would increase the rate of carbon leakage. 
If this would be the case, the conventional gains-from-trade would be compromised and 
there would perhaps be a reason for negotiators of multilateral or other free trade agree-
ments to take the effect of trade liberalization on carbon leakage into account when for-
mulating their agreements (or at least to coordinate their actions with environmental pol-
icy-makers). 
Before an overview of the literature on this subject is presented, it should be noted that 
the theory of international trade is built on two important ideas from the founding fathers 
of economics. The first is the idea of comparative advantage, developed by David Ri-
cardo (1821), who argued that relative cost differences between countries (and not abso-
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lute cost differences) were the cause of profitable international trade.15 The second idea, 
in fact the older one, is the concept of economies of scale, which can be traced back to 
Adam Smith (1776), and his proposition that the degree of profitable specialization of 
labor depends on the size of the market. In modern times, the idea of comparative advan-
tage has been formalized first, resulting in the now classical Heckscher-Ohlin theorem of 
international trade. For some decades, the theory of international trade has been, in fact, 
a theory of comparative advantage. The theoretical formalization of the idea of econo-
mies of scale as an important cause of trade is from a later date. Although the importance 
of both ideas is now fully recognized in the theory of international trade (see, e.g., 
Krugman and Obstfeld (2000)), the idea of comparative advantage has led to the most 
developed and consistent theoretical models of international trade, and underlies most of 
the applied modeling in this field. The idea of economies of scale has led to a series of 
important and illuminating theoretical models, but as yet, not to a unified and coherent 
model with the same power as the comparative advantage model. Most of the environ-
ment-and-trade literature is built on the classical, comparative-advantage model of inter-
national trade.  
The effects of freer trade on the environment have been the subject of a significant body 
of theoretical and empirical research. It is beyond the scope of this section to give an ex-
haustive overview of this literature. For excellent overviews the interested reader is re-
ferred to Rauscher (1997) and Dean (1992; 2002). In the early 1970s, several authors be-
gan to examine the consequences of the existence of environmental externalities for 
standard trade theory, especially with respect to the theorem of comparative advantage 
and the gains from trade. Markusen (1975)16 and Pethig (1976) were among the first to 
formalize the problem of environmental externalities in the standard two-sector, two-
country general equilibrium model of international trade. A general conclusion from this 
literature was that domestic environmental externalities could reduce the conventional 
gains from trade, but that the first-best solution to deal with this problem was not to re-
strict trade, but to ‘internalize’ the environmental externalities through appropriate gov-
ernment intervention. This work could therefore also be read as a theoretical justification 
of OECD’s famous ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ of 1972. 
Theoretical and applied work on the environmental effects of trade liberalization were 
greatly stimulated by the controversies surrounding the preparations and conclusion of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s. One important 
study of that time decomposed the impacts of trade liberalization on the environment 
into three effects: the effects of changes in scale, composition and technique (Grossman 
& Krueger, 1991). The general ambiguity of theoretical models that dealt with environ-
ment-and-trade interactions could be explained by the fact that in many situations the 
three distinct effects would not all point in the same direction. The scale effect is propor-
tionally related to the overall expansion (or contraction) of an economy after the liberali-
                                                   
15  For an excellent, non-technical and very amusing introduction to the idea of comparative ad-
vantage, see Krugman (2001).  
16  For a discussion of Markusen’s paper, see Chapter 2. Markusen’s paper stands somewhat 
apart from other early contributions as it dealt explicitly with international environmental ex-
ternalities, while the other contributions primarily dealt with domestic environmental exter-
nalities.  
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zation of trade. In most cases this effect will be positive, hence pollution will increase. 
The composition effect is related to the changes in sectoral composition of an economy 
after trade liberalization. It may be the case that an economy moves towards an increased 
specialization in polluting sectors, or, alternatively, towards clean sectors. Finally, the 
technique effect is related to the mix of polluting and clean inputs that is used by the 
economy. Trade liberalization may affect this mix in two ways. First, trade liberalization 
may affect the price ratio between polluting and clean inputs, thereby changing the opti-
mal mix for producers and consumers. Second, if trade liberalization increases the in-
comes of consumers, they may want to spend (some of) their additional income on more 
protection of the environment in order to enjoy better environmental quality. The gov-
ernment can meet this demand by imposing stricter environmental standards on polluting 
production processes, thereby indirectly affecting the ‘technique’ of production.17 Ant-
weiler et al. (2001) put the ‘scale, composition and technique’ decomposition in a theo-
retical model framework and provide econometric estimates of their magnitudes in the 
case of sulfur dioxide concentrations in over forty countries. They found that a one per-
cent increase in per capita GDP due to trade liberalization reduces concentrations of sul-
fur dioxide by one per cent, due to a particularly strong ‘technique’ effect (due to stricter 
environmental regulations). 
In the same article, Antweiler et al. (2001) presented two opposing theoretical views on 
the environmental effects of trade liberalization. The first view, the Pollution Haven hy-
pothesis, suggests that trade liberalization will make countries with less stringent envi-
ronmental regulations dirtier. Unilateral emission restrictions, as in the Kyoto Protocol, 
increase the comparative advantage of non-abating countries in ‘dirty goods’ production. 
Trade liberalization encourages specialization according to comparative advantages and 
hence encourages the shift of carbon-intensive industries to countries without a carbon 
dioxide reduction target. 
In contrast, the second view, the Factor Endowment hypothesis, suggests that when 
emissions are concentrated in capital-intensive industries, as is the case for carbon diox-
ide emissions, then trade liberalization would lead to a further concentration of these in-
dustries in relatively capital abundant countries, i.e., the Annex-I countries. Non-Annex-I 
countries would be encouraged to specialize according to their traditional comparative 
advantages, i.e., in labor and natural resource-intensive industries that are, on average, 
not carbon-intensive. To illustrate the Factor Endowment hypothesis, Copeland and Tay-
lor (1994) examined a two-sector, two-country general equilibrium “specific factors” 
model, in which both sectors in each country use pollution as a factor of production, and 
                                                   
17  To avoid confusion, the concept ‘technique’ is different from the concepts of ‘technological 
development’ or ‘technical change’. The ‘technique’ of production refers to the specific mix 
of inputs that a firm (or industry, or economy) uses to produce one unit of output. Note that 
the ‘inputs’ include emissions of environmental pollutants. The concepts ‘technological de-
velopment’ or ‘technical change’ usually refer to an increase in knowledge so that less inputs 
are required to produce a given amount of output, or equivalently, that more output can be 
produced with the same inputs. Environmental technical change means that a given amount 
of output can be produced with less input of emissions of environmental pollutants and a 
non-increasing amount of other inputs. This study does not address the causes and conse-
quences of technological development or technical change.   
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each sector uses a specific factor for production, capital or labor, respectively. Capital 
and pollution are assumed complementary, that is, the capital-intensive industry is also 
pollution-intensive. One country, the ‘North’, is assumed to be relatively capital abun-
dant and it has stricter emission controls than the other country, the ‘South’. Copeland 
and Taylor showed that trade increases production of the capital-intensive good in the 
North and its exports to the South, whereas the South expands its intensive-intensive 
production. Freer trade reduces pollution in the South, and in the context of climate 
change, this model suggests that it would be possible, under certain circumstances, for 
trade liberalization to reduce carbon leakage to non-Annex-I countries.18 
Antweiler et al. (2001) argued, however, that it cannot be determined on first principles 
whether the Pollution Haven hypothesis or the Factor Endowment hypothesis will hold. 
It is therefore a subject for empirical analysis. 
Cole et al. (1998) assessed the global impacts on emissions of the trade policy changes 
that were agreed upon in the Uruguay Round. First, Cole et al. estimated the impacts of 
the Uruguay Round on the regional output of various industries and on per capita in-
comes. In a second stage, Cole et al. estimated the effect on emissions (that is, the com-
position effect), and then use econometrically estimated relationships between per capita 
income and emissions to estimate a combined scale and technique effect. They found, for 
industrialized countries, that the composition effect increases the emissions of four tradi-
tional air pollutants (nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and suspended 
particulate matter). In contrast, in most developing countries (except for Latin America), 
the composition effect reduces these emissions. Trade liberalization encourages the ex-
pansion of energy-intensive industries in industrialized countries, while developing 
countries specialize in labor-intensive manufactures, such as textiles. In other words, re-
garding the issue of climate change, the study by Cole et al. suggested that the Factor 
Endowment hypothesis might dominate the Pollution Haven hypothesis. That is, freer 
trade might reduce the rate of carbon leakage. 
Babiker et al. (1997) assessed, before the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol, the mutual 
effects that trade policies and CO2 reduction policies can have on each other. They used 
a static 26-region, 13-sector computable general equilibrium model of the global econ-
omy that was originally constructed for the analysis of the economic impacts of changes 
in trade policies (the Uruguay Round), but that was extended with a representation of en-
ergy markets and carbon flows. They found that global trade liberalization as agreed in 
the Uruguay Round, in isolation (without carbon reduction policies), would increase 
global CO2 emissions. In combination with unilateral CO2 emissions reduction of An-
nex-I countries, however, trade liberalization would reduce global emissions and carbon 
leakage. Unfortunately, the authors did not explain this result in great detail and the 
mechanisms underlying their result remain unclear. 
Kuik and Gerlagh (2003) assessed the rates of carbon leakage under the Kyoto Protocol 
with and without freer trade by means of import tariff reductions agreed to in the Uru-
                                                   
18  It has to be pointed out that the ‘pollution’ in Copeland and Taylor’s model is purely domes-
tic, and that endogenous environmental policies in both countries set optimal emission levels. 
In contrast, the climate change problem is truly global in nature, and it is not apparent that 
Copeland and Taylor’s results carry over. 
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guay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. They found that the implementation of 
these import tariff reductions increases the overall rate of leakage, suggesting that previ-
ous studies may structurally have underestimated the rate of carbon leakage under the 
Kyoto Protocol. They also found, however, that the costs of abating the trade-induced 
leakage are modest relative to the welfare gains of freer trade. Analysis of the trade-
induced carbon leakage showed large differences between leakage caused by reductions 
of import tariffs on energy goods (high leakage) and by reductions of import tariffs on 
non-energy goods (low leakage). It also showed large differences in emission responses 
among developing country regions, with the largest responses by (and therefore the larg-
est leakage to) Brazil and the Middle East and the smallest responses by (and the small-
est leakage to) net energy exporting developing countries and the dynamic Asian 
economies (excluding China) (Kuik and Gerlagh, 2003). 
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5. Policy implications of carbon leakage  
Carbon leakage decreases the net effect of domestic CO2 emissions reduction on the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It therefore reduces the effective-
ness and also the cost-effectiveness of CO2 reduction policies. If, for example, the Neth-
erlands would, because of the Kyoto Protocol, restrict its CO2 emissions in 2010 by 13 
million tons in comparison to business as usual, a leakage rate of 20 percent would limit 
the Netherlands’ net contribution to global emissions reductions to (13 - 0.2 * 13) = 10.4 
million tons. Alternatively, if abatement costs in the Netherlands would be € 20 per ton 
of CO2 reduced domestically, it would be 13/10.4 * 20 = € 25 per ton of CO2 reduced 
globally.  
Whether a leakage rate of 5, 10, 20 or 40 percent or more is acceptable or not is a 
political judgment. At any leakage rate below 100 percent, Dutch CO2 reduction policies 
contribute to global CO2 reductions, but the higher the rate of leakage, the lower the net 
effect on global emissions and the higher the cost per ton of net, global, CO2 reduction.    
The first-best policy to reduce carbon leakage is to increase the size of the group of abat-
ing countries.19 To reduce global carbon leakage, it is not important that additional coun-
tries to any international agreement are forced to substantial reductions; it is enough if 
they agree to any binding target (which might be a zero reduction target with respect to 
their baseline emissions, i.e., an allowed increase of emissions from, say, 1990 levels). 
Therefore, it would generally improve the effectiveness of the successor of the Kyoto 
Protocol, if currently non-participating Annex I countries (USA, Australia) and (at least) 
the larger developing countries (China, India and Brazil) would effectively participate 
with binding (although not necessarily very restrictive) reduction targets.   
Without such broader participation (or in anticipation of such broader participation), it 
might be worth considering whether domestic or regional (EU) reduction policies could 
be designed in a manner to reduce carbon leakage. The second-best policy would be to 
implement import and export taxes for the international trade of CO2-intensive products 
with non-abating countries. It is commonly believed that such a form of trade discrimina-
tion would not be allowed under the rules and disciplines of the WTO, but there are 
precedents by the way of Multilateral Environmental Agreements with (discriminating) 
trade provisions that have not (yet) been challenged before the WTO. Nevertheless, it 
                                                   
19  Note that what matters is not so much the number of countries, but rather the fraction of 
global emissions covered. Note also that leakage to some countries (e.g., in Asia) is more 
likely than leakage to other countries (e.g., in Africa). 
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appears that the participating countries to the Kyoto Protocol do not actively investigate 
this second-best policy.20  
If this trade policy would not be feasible, a third-best policy would be to differentiate 
domestic CO2 reduction policies among sectors. On the basis of their CO2 intensity and 
sensitivity to international trade, economic sectors can be classified into ‘exposed’ and 
‘sheltered’ (Berkhout, Felso, Ferrer-Carbonell et al., 2001). In general, ‘sheltered’ sec-
tors may be less vulnerable to leakage than ‘exposed’ sectors (Paltsev, 2001), although 
differences among sectors and even among firms within these broad classes may be sig-
nificant.  
Any policy that would simply shift a part of the CO2 reduction burden from the ‘ex-
posed’ to the ‘sheltered’ sectors could reduce leakage, but would increase aggregate na-
tional abatement costs. This increase in costs could be justified from a global cost-
effectiveness perspective if the relative increase in costs would be less (in absolute 
terms) than the resulting reduction in leakage rate.  
Most European governments do have special arrangements in their environmental poli-
cies for energy-intensive manufacturing industries (Ekins & Speck, 1999). In the Nether-
lands, these industries are subject to voluntary agreements on energy efficiency and CO2 
emissions, the so-called Benchmarking Covenants. It is generally believed that the tar-
gets in these voluntary agreements are not very strict (Kuik & Mulder, 2004; Sijm, 
2004a), so that the net costs of CO2 reduction measures in the energy-intensive manufac-
turing industries will be small – or even negative (Sijm, 2004a). While such special ar-
rangements could reduce leakage, they also might leave some cost-effective mitigation 
options in the energy-intensive manufacturing industries untapped, thereby potentially 
increasing total mitigation costs for the economy. Moreover, lax standards for the en-
ergy-intensive manufacturing sectors will not stimulate technological innovation and dif-
fusion of CO2-efficient production techniques.  
On the issue of lax environmental standards, Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) argued that 
environmental policy faced a time inconsistency problem: as long as a firm has not in-
vested in a country, a government has an incentive to keep emission taxes low. However, 
if the investment has been completed, governments maximizing welfare could have an 
incentive to increase taxes. In terms of carbon leakage, this would imply that firms, who 
are aware of this time inconsistency, would rather invest in a non-abating country. One 
way out of this problem would be to use instruments that pre-commit a government to 
some level of environmental taxation. Pre-commitment could be an option to limit car-
bon leakage through international capital mobility.  
                                                   
20  Perhaps it is worth mentioning, as one of the reviewers of an earlier version of this report 
suggested, that the WTO makes a specific and clear claim that the organization does not deal 
with environmental protection. The WTO’s role is to liberalise trade. Its only dealing with 
environmental policies is to ensure that these policies do not act as obstacles to trade, and that 
trade rules do not stand in the way of adequate domestic environmental protection. 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_backgrnd_e/c1s3_e.htm). Note also that, if emission 
reduction policy is based on a carbon or energy tax, border tax adjustments could be allowed, 
in principle, under WTO law. 
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The objective of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions throughout Europe at the lowest cost. In the first phase (2005-2007), the ETS 
focuses on the greenhouse gas CO2 only, and on a number of energy-intensive industries 
(or rather: ‘installations’).21 In principle, the ETS could lead to lower mitigation costs in 
energy-intensive manufacturing industries, thereby reducing the potential of leakage. In 
any case, emissions trading is very likely to reduce negative impact on the international 
competitiveness of energy-intensive industries, and is therefore likely to reduce the risk 
of international relocation of firms. It is too early to tell, however, how effective the ETS 
will become, especially in its first phases (Kruger & Pizer, 2004; Sijm, 2004a).  
A Dutch advisory commission on emissions trading recently proposed to subject ‘ex-
posed’ sectors to CO2-intensity standards, so-called Performance Rate Standards (PSRs) 
(Commissie CO2-handel, 2002), while ‘sheltered’ sectors would be subject to an abso-
lute ceiling. For the exposed sectors, the system would not be based on an absolute ceil-
ing (an absolute volume of CO2 emissions), but on a relative ceiling, i.e., CO2 emissions 
per unit of output.22 Gielen et al. (2002) argued on the basis of a small theoretical model 
that such a dual system would, on the one hand, provide the right incentive for the ex-
posed sectors to carry out all cost-effective mitigation measures, but would on the other 
hand, work as an output subsidy for the exposed sectors, so that their output would be 
less reduced than under an undifferentiated system with an absolute ceiling on national 
emissions.  
While such a dual system might be less efficient from a purely domestic perspective, its 
propensity to reduce leakage could make it (perhaps) more efficient from a global per-
spective.23 The system also provides incentives for technological innovation and diffu-
sion of CO2-efficient production techniques because the existence of a market for emis-
sions allowances (the sheltered sector), so that any reduction in CO2 intensity (CO2 emis-
sions per unit of output) can directly be ‘sold’ in the form of the sale of emissions allow-
ances. The linkage between a ‘relative’ (rate-based) sector and an ‘absolute’ sector poses 
                                                   
21  Combustion plants > 20 MW, oil refineries, coke ovens, ferrous metals, cement clinker, pulp 
from timber, glass and ceramics (Sijm, 2004a).  
22  The UK Emissions Trading System allows for both absolute and relative (rate-based) targets. 
Participants to the so-called Climate Change Levy Agreement can opt for relative targets. A 
complicated mechanism (the ‘Gateway’) has been set-up to regulate the trade of emission al-
lowances between the ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ sectors (Baron et al., 2002).  
23  Gielen et al. (2002) argued that the costs of meeting a specified domestic target increase un-
der this dual system. Economic instruments, such as a CO2 tax or emissions trading have two 
effects: an abatement effect (reducing emissions per unit of output) and an output-
substitution effect (reducing the share of CO2-intensive output in total national output). In 
comparison with emissions trading under an absolute ceiling, the dual system with an abso-
lute ceiling for the sheltered sectors and relative ceilings for the exposed sectors would pro-
duce the same abatement effect but a smaller output-substitution effect. Because emissions 
trading under an absolute ceiling can, under certain assumptions, lead to a least-cost solution 
for emissions reduction, the dual system must lead to a higher-cost solution. The ‘certain as-
sumptions’ are important, however. They include, for instance, the absence of distorting 
taxes on energy goods in the initial equilibrium. Also, Gielen et al. do not address the magni-
tude of the cost increase.  
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some administrative difficulties that have to be solved before such a system can work in 
practice (Baron & Bygrave, 2002).24 
An interesting question is whether public support for energy R&D25 in the energy-
intensive manufacturing sectors could lead to increased innovation and technology spill-
overs as well as reduced leakage. Could energy R&D be a ‘double-edged sword’? Tech-
nology spillovers is the subject of the accompanying report of Sijm (2004b). To summa-
rize an important point very briefly, there are two alternative views on the relationship 
between induced technological change and the cost of climate policy. The first view 
states that climate policy lead to a more rapid technological change and, therefore, to a 
lower cost of climate policy. The second view refers to the fact that ‘climate-related’ 
R&D would absorb funds from the other research areas and, therefore, the cost for the 
society from the climate policy is going to be higher with induced technological change. 
This discussion is, however, beyond the scope of this report, and here we will focus on 
the relationship between R&D and leakage only.26 
Government support for of innovation can be divided into (at least) three different cate-
gories: i) the sponsoring of research and development activities for new technologies, ii) 
the stimulation of market adoption of new technologies, and iii) investment and exploita-
tion subsidies for adopted new technologies. It is especially the third category of public 
stimulation of R&D that has a direct effect on marginal costs of production and therefore 
on international competitiveness and leakage. The first two categories of stimulation 
could increase competitiveness only in the longer term, when technological innovations 
might potentially reduce marginal costs. If the mitigation of leakage (also in the short 
term) would become an important objective of public support for R&D, this might lead 
to a shift in support from basic R&D (i) to investment and exploitation subsidies (iii). 
The balance between basic R&D and investment and exploitation subsidies is, however, 
already heavily tilted towards the latter in Dutch R&D policies. Because climate change 
is a long-term problem, it would probably be unwise to let short term concerns (competi-
tiveness and leakage) shift attention away from long-term solutions that are likely to re-
quire an increased research effort by the energy community.27  
Note that R&D would increase the availability of commercial carbon-extensive tech-
nologies not just in countries with emission reduction targets, but in all countries. This 
has not been extensively studied in the current literature. 
In the long run, increased energy R&D and competitiveness can and should go hand in 
hand. We do not, however, advocate the deployment of R&D instruments to protect 
competitiveness and to reduce leakage in the short run. In the short to medium term 
leakage could be reduced through i) increasing country participation in international 
greenhouse gas mitigation agreements, ii) applying trade measures to the import and ex-
port of CO2-intensive manufactures in the international trade with non-participants to the 
                                                   
24  See also footnote 22 above. 
25  Or, as it is called in recent policy jargon, RD&D (Research, Development and Deployment).  
26  We will also not address the question of the effectiveness of public support for (energy) 
R&D. This is a crucial question on which very little is known.  
27  The World Energy Council has stated that energy-related R&D expenses are “dangerously 
low” in comparison to other technology-intensive sectors.  
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above agreements, and iii) the design and implementation of domestic or European emis-
sion reduction schemes that combine an effective ‘abatement effect’ with a weak ‘out-
put-substitution’ effect for the most ‘exposed’ sectors. 
However, as most researchers argue that leakage in the short to medium term is primarily 
caused by changes in relative prices of energy goods (the energy trade channel) and not 
by industrial relocation, one could also accept an ‘unavoidable’ rate of leakage in the 
short to medium term and concentrate on action to avoid leakage by industrial relocation 
in the longer term. The most obvious course of action would be to stimulate innovation 
to improve the CO2–efficiency of exposed sectors in order for them to remain competi-
tive on the world market. In an accompanying report, Sijm (2004b) examines the options 
and barriers for technological progress in this respect. 
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6. Conclusions 
Carbon leakage refers to the effect that a part of the CO2 reduction that is achieved by 
countries that abate CO2 emissions is offset by an increase in CO2 emissions in non-
abating countries. Carbon leakage can either occur through a combination of changes in 
relative energy prices, changes in international trade of energy-intensive goods, interna-
tional reallocation of capital and because of interactions between government climate 
change policies. The size of carbon leakage because of the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol is still uncertain: it is estimated that between 5 and 20 percent of CO2 mitigation 
in Annex I countries will be offset by increases in emissions by non-Annex I countries. 
Some observers expect a lower rate of leakage because they expect that governments of 
Annex I countries will take active measures to prevent industrial relocation. A higher 
rate of leakage may, however, be caused by the non-participation of major Annex I 
countries such as the U.S. and Australia and non-binding targets for Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. 
Carbon leakage reduces the global cost-effectiveness of domestic and EU CO2 mitigation 
measures. The first-best policy to counteract leakage is increasing country participation 
in international greenhouse gas mitigation agreements. The second-best policy is apply-
ing trade measures to the import and export of CO2-intensive manufactures in the inter-
national trade with non-participants to the above agreements. The third-best policy is to 
design and implementation of domestic or European emission reduction schemes that 
combine an effective ‘abatement effect’ with a weak ‘output-substitution’ effect for the 
most ‘exposed’ sectors. This is no easy task, however. An alternative option would be to 
accept a certain ‘unavoidable’ rate of leakage in the short to medium term (which is be-
lieved to be primarily caused by relative changes in the prices of energy goods) and con-
centrate on action to avoid leakage through industrial relocation. The EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme and other international emissions trading initiatives can potentially re-
duce negative effects on the international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. 
In the long run, sustainable innovation in the energy system, competitiveness and leak-
age reduction should go hand in hand.  
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